Abstract. A standard contract between two commercial banks, structured to resemble an interbank repurchase agreement, is considered to examine the endogenous choice of collateral assets, the feasibility of secured lending, and the welfare implications of the central bank's collateral framework. Our findings have an immediate bearing on the market developments in the second half of the year 2007. JEL classification: G21, G32, E51.
Non-technical summary (working paper version only)
Why is it the case that illiquid and risky assets are used so little as collateral in the interbank market? How could it happen that, during the summer turbulences of 2007, interbank lending secured by certain types of collateral (such as structured assets) become so much less common in the money mar- To explore these and related questions, the present paper takes a closer look at the role of collateral in the interbank lending relationship. A scenario is analyzed in which two commercial banks, a borrower and a lender, negotiate simultaneously about (a) the collateral assets to be used, (b) the haircut, and (c) the interest rate. In contrast to the existing theoretical literature, we consider two-sided credit risk, i.e., the possibility that also the lender may default. The following results are obtained.
First, we demonstrate that it will always be efficient to share risks between the two counterparties. As a consequence, if two commercial banks agree to transact, they always agree to use the most liquid and the least risky assets of the borrower as collateral first. Thus, in a bilateral transaction between two commercial banks that may each default with positive probability, good collateral drives out bad collateral.
Second, if the most liquid and least risky assets of the borrower are still relatively illiquid or risky, then the two banks may, under certain conditions, not be able to agree on a transaction at all. This outcome occurs in particular if default probabilities are non-negligible and collateral assets have the potential to become illiquid. The break-down of the market under two-sided credit risk is a potentially important result as it can explain why there is hardly any interbank repo market in which risky or illiquid asset types are used as collateral. It also adds to existing structural explanations of the microstructure of the money market based on asymmetric information, and last but not least allows us to apply an important theoretical argument that has been put forward recently by Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) . For the euro area, the analysis comes to the conclusion that a widening of the set of eligible collateral would not necessarily be supportive for a resolution of the credit crunch in the interbank market. There is no evidence that too much high quality collateral is bound in central bank operations.
The funding problems seem instead to be linked to a general concern about the quality of collateral assets, which inhibits market performance when there is mutual mistrust between banks. The analysis clearly suggests that money markets would benefit from making central counterparty trading accessible to a wider group of market participants.
Introduction
Interbank money markets are increasingly characterized by secured transactions. For instance, according to ECB (2007a) , the euro repo market has been growing on average by 17% annually since 2002, while the unsecured market segment in the euro area has expanded only moderately over the same period. For central banks, the repo market is of particular interest.
Like the unsecured market, it is a mechanism to redistribute central bank deposits among banks. Like central bank lending operations, repo market trades are collateralized and therefore represent a closer substitute to central bank operations than unsecured money market trades.
However, there is a pronounced disparity in the collateral usage between the private market and central bank operations. For the euro money market, Comotto (2007) This situation stands in stark contrast with the composition of collateral held with the European Central Bank that accepts a wide range of asset types including for example government bonds, covered and uncovered bank 4 Indeed, recent data by Clearstream (2007, p. 15) shows that the share of structured securities used as collateral on the platform has fallen from 35 percent to 25 percent between June 1 and September 14, 2007, with ABS Auto, Card, CDOs, and MBS the most affected through the subprime crisis. increased significantly since the beginning of the turbulences in August (see, e.g., Crawford et al., 2007) . Partly as a consequence of such developments, the collateral policy of central banks during both normal and turbulent times as well as its implications for welfare and financial stability has become a major subject of discussions among central bankers.
To contribute to this discussion, the present paper takes a closer look at the role of collateral in interbank lending relationships. A hypothetical scenario is studied in which two commercial banks, a borrower and a lender, negotiate simultaneously about (a) the collateral assets to be used, (b) the haircut, and (c) the interest rate. In contrast to the existing theoretical literature, 5 we consider two-sided credit risk, i.e., the possibility that also the lender may default. This has potentially important consequences for the 5 Cf. in particular the literature surveyed by Freixas and Rochet (1997) .
economic determinants of collateral.
With two-sided credit risk, the negotiation achieves a subtle balance of interests between borrower and lender. On the one hand, the lender may be willing to accept a somewhat lower haircut in exchange for a somewhat higher interest rate, as a higher haircut obviously implies better protection for the lender. Conversely, the borrower may be willing to provide somewhat more collateral for a somewhat lowered interest rate. This is not costless, however, because there is the real risk that collateral deposited by the borrower may get lost in the lender's insolvency mass. Optimal risk sharing is achieved, therefore, by making the marginal rate of substitution between haircut and interest rate congruent between the two counterparties. It turns out that, as a consequence, if collateral is not perfect, i.e., if price fluctuations or illiquidity is feasible, then it is typically optimal to expose both parties to non-trivial credit risk.
The efficiency of risk sharing is what ultimately drives our first main result. This result says that if two commercial banks agree to transact, they always agree to use the most liquid and the least risky assets of the borrower as collateral first. In particular, the pooling of collateral assets of heterogeneous quality is typically a dominated option. Thus, in a bilateral transaction between two commercial banks that may each default with positive probability, good collateral drives bad collateral out of circulation, suggesting an intuitive analogy with Gresham's law for commodity money.
We go on and study the general feasibility of secured contracting under market stress. It is shown that the most liquid and least risky assets of the borrower are still relatively illiquid or risky then the two banks may, even under symmetric information and zero opportunity costs of collateral, not be able to agree on a transaction at all. This outcome occurs in particular if default probabilities are perceived as non-negligible by market participants, which relates our analysis to the developments in the money markets following August 2007. The break-down of the market under two-sided credit risk also adds to existing structural explanations of the microstructure of the money market based on asymmetric information, and explains the existence of central counterparties. Last but not least, this second result allows us to relate our analysis to an important theoretical argument that has been put forward recently by Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) .
The final part of the analysis is concerned with the question of how the central bank's collateral policy affects welfare. It is shown that, provided that the central bank's liquidity policy follows suit, any expansion of the set of collateral eligible for central bank operations leads to a welfare improvement for market participants. However, the expansion of the set of eligible collateral is typically accompanied by a replacement of liquid collateral by illiquid collateral, increasing potentially the central bank's risk exposure. The analysis allows discussing policy proposals concerning the collateral framework that have been made in the context of fiscal discipline of euro area member countries and in the context of the subprime crisis.
The analysis relates to two strands of the theoretical literature. The first is concerned with credit rationing and collateral. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) have shown that credit rationing may occur as a consequence of asymmetric information either at a pre-or post-contracting stage. Bester (1985) argued that in the case of pre-contracting asymmetric information, the adverse selection problem may be resolved when commitment to costly collateral is feasible for entrepreneurs with relatively low risks. Berger and Udell (1990) note that existing theoretical and empirical approaches to the use of collateral still have to be reconciled. Flannery (1995) has studied the breakdown of the unsecured money market in a crisis situation.
The second strand of literature related to the present study is concerned with rediscounting and payments. Freeman (1996) 
maximizes expected utility from terminal payoffs.
The time structure of the model is drawn in Figure 1 . Between dates 0 and 1, there is a publicly observable random customer request to transfer an amount λ > 0 of cash at date 1. With equal probability, the transfer will be 6 Kocherlakota (2001) uses risky collateral to rationalize deposit insurance. 7 An extension to more than two counterparties is not attempted here. See Tapking (2006) for a multilateral bargaining model of the money market.
from Bank 1 to Bank 2 or vice versa from Bank 2 to Bank 1. The absolute size λ of the liquidity shock may also be random. However, without loss of generality, λ will initially be normalized to one "unit." To compensate for the liquidity shock, the bank receiving the transfer, bank i L , will seek to become a lender in the money market, while the bank sending the funds, bank i B , will seek to become a borrower.
By definition, if not defaulted, a commercial bank in the role of the borrower (lender) is equipped at date 2 with sufficient assets to repay principal and interest (to redeliver the collateral). Without loss of generality, there are then three states of nature: In state ω = G, neither the lender nor the borrower defaults (this is the "good" state); in state ω = B, only the borrower defaults; and in state ω = L, only the lender defaults. Denote by π ω = π ω (i B , i L ) the probability that state ω realizes at date 2, where ω ∈ {G, B, L}. Clearly, π G + π B + π L = 1. The utility in case of own default is normalized to zero.
The following assumption is fundamental to all what follows. To our knowledge, it also marks the departure from the existing theoretical literature on collateralized lending.
To mitigate two-sided credit risks, banks might in principle want to write complicated contracts that condition on all the information observable and verifiable at date 2. However, to make progress, we shall instead consider an institutional form of the (sale and) repurchase agreement.
8 Specifically,
it is assumed that counterparties may sign a standard repurchase agreement (SRA) C = (y, h, r), which is composed of a collateral composition y, a haircut h ≥ −1, and an interest rate r. Here and later on, a composition is a collection y = (y 1 , ..., y m ) of weights y j ≥ 0 for individual assets j such that P m j=1 y j = 1. The agreement foresees that the lender promises to transfer one unit of cash at date 1. The borrower in turn promises to deposit a portfolio of collateral with composition y with the lender at date 1.
9 Moreover, the common haircut h is applied to all assets. 10 At date 2, in the good state, the borrower will repay the principal plus an interest (rate) r. The lender, in turn, redelivers the collateral to the borrower. (2000) foresees a set-off of mutual claims in case of one-sided insolvency, where collateral claims are evaluated by the non-defaulting party either by actual, quotes, or estimated market prices. In fact, this contract has been used prevalently in major repo markets (cf. Garbade, 2006, and Comotto, 2007) .
13 Alternatively, there is no market available at date 2, and prices reflect the second-best alternative. For instance, when no buyer can be found for the collateral, then e v b should be replaced by the present value of the cash flow generated by holding the collateral until maturity net of costs of funding temporary liquidity demand. Similarly, if the collateral lost in a default of a counterparty cannot be purchased in the market, then e v a should be replaced by the hypothetical present value of holding the collateral until maturity net of profits generated by the second-best use of the additional liquidity. 
where v a is the realized repurchase price of the collateral portfolio at date 2. In reality, the extent to which such a potential loss becomes an actual loss depends on several factors including whether the insolvency assets of the defaulting party have some market value, and whether the net claim of the non-defaulting party is senior to claims by third parties. The following assumption is made for simplicity.
Assumption 3. (Subordination) Any net claim of the non-defaulting party vis-à-vis the defaulting party will be completely lost.
As an additional matter, the agreement must be specific about what happens when the defaulting party has a claim that exceeds the claim of the nondefaulting party. A very primitive form of netting would imply that the non-defaulting party ends up with a windfall profit. For instance, in the case of the borrower's default, the lender could sell the collateral and keep any potential interim increase in the market price. Similarly, in the case of the lender's default, the borrower would profit from a decline in the collateral value. This primitive form of netting is not applied in the money market. Assumptions 2 through 4 complement the contract and thereby determine conditional expected utilities for the two counterparties. Write
. Let e u L and e u B , respectively, denote the lender's and the borrower's uncertain terminal utility at the time of contracting. Then the lender's expected utility at the time of contracting is given by
where E[.] denotes the unconditional expectation operator. Similarly,
will be the borrower's expected utility at the time of contracting.
From the explicit expressions for the counterparties' expected utilities, it is immediate that the two-sided credit risk could be effectively eliminated by using a type of collateral that shares the desirable properties of cash in terms of risklessness and liquidity. Such a collateral is very unlikely to exist in reality. Let e p Clearly,
and
It is assumed in the sequel that the multivariate conditional distributions of the vectors (e p A scenario will be considered now in which lender and borrower bargain to an efficient outcome. Let q i j ≥ 0 denote bank i's initial endowment of collateral asset j, for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, ..., m. Apparently, the bargaining set for borrower and lender will consist of all standard repurchase agreements (y, h, r) that satisfy
An SRA that satisfies (5) will be called valid. A valid SRA is efficient when the pair of counterparties' expected utilities resulting from the contract is not dominated, in the Pareto sense, by expected utilities resulting from any other valid SRA. Obviously, in an efficient SRA, the marginal rate of substitution between haircut and interest rate will be the same for lender and borrower.
Given our assumptions, it turns out any efficient SRA will expose both the lender and the borrower to non-trivial credit risk.
Theorem 1 (Risk sharing). Under Assumptions 1 through 5, for any efficient SRA, pr(e v b < 1 + r) > 0 and pr(e v a > 1 + r) > 0.
As a consequence of risk sharing, the following testable characterization of the market contract can be derived.
Theorem 2 (Gresham's law for collateral, market version). Under
where j * is the smallest index such that
Proof. See the Appendix. ¤ Thus, provided that rational counterparties reach an efficient outcome, good collateral is used up first in the interbank lending relationship. Illiquid collateral is not used in the market because it would not allow counterparties to share their risks resulting from the agreement as efficiently as with liquid collateral. Theorem 2 thereby offers an explanation for the empirical finding mentioned in the Introduction that interbank repos are so much concentrated on liquid collateral.
If credit risk is one-sided only (and collateral is ample), the economic characteristics of the collateral asset should play a subordinated role. For instance, if the lender cannot default then the borrower could in many cases offer even very illiquid assets as collateral. Indeed, provided that the liquidation value of the collateral asset is bounded away from zero, a sufficiently large haircut would fully protect the lender against any credit risk. Conversely, when the borrower cannot default, no collateral is needed in the first place.
Theorem 2 also predicts that a combination of collateral assets across liquidity baskets is not desirable per se. I.e., there is no intrinsic value of collateral diversification. This should be intuitive because in contrast to the problem of portfolio choice, there is no trade-off between risk and liquidity on the one hand, and return on the other.
Feasibility of the market transaction
In this section, it is shown that interbank lending may not be feasible even if collateral causes no opportunity costs, information is symmetrically distributed, and physical transaction costs are zero. Sufficient conditions for a market break-down are that both banks default with positive probability and that assets that available as collateral are not perfectly liquid or else not absolutely risk-free.
But indeed, counterparties will approve a contract only when it is individually rational to do so. We assume outside option utilities of
is the opportunity lending rate and r
is the risk-free opportunity deposit rate. In practice, such outside options might include outright transactions, money market transactions with nonbanks, recourses to the central bank's standing facilities, renegotiation of contractual obligations, accepting a contractual penalty, etc. In the worst case, banks might become more reluctant to offer credit to non-banks.
For any given r D , denote by ρ D (h) the lowest deposit rate that a lender would be willing to accept for a given haircut h. Clearly,
Similarly, for any given opportunity rate r L , denote by ρ L (h) ≤ r L the highest lending rate that the borrower would accept for a given haircut h. Proof. See the Appendix. ¤ Theorem 3 offers an explanation for the observation that in times of financial distress and mutual distrust, financial institutions may not be willing to exchange liquidity against relatively illiquid collateral. In reality, such a break-down may be driven by several, mutually reinforcing factors. First, banks may perceive a higher probability of an individual default. Second, perceptions of potential illiquidity and riskiness may increase, making it more difficult to achieve conditions that are individually rational for both sides of the contract. Third, counterparties may also become more risk-averse.
Fourth, there may be the fear that liquidity needs still increase. Finally, even if a counterparty would be willing to give cash for collateral today, this counterparty may be less confident that the collateral will be accepted tomorrow. The joint effect of such developments may lead to a disruption even of the "secured" segment of the interbank market.
Theorem 3 captures the fact that even in the repo market, a counterparty benefits significantly from contracting with a counterparty that has a good credit rating. In reality, this benefit should be reflected in the topology of the interbank network. Two types of regularities are predicted. First, banks with an excellent rating may be able to intermediate in the repo market. In practice, this should lead to a two-tiered structure of the repo market, just as derived for the unsecured market by Freixas and Holthausen (2004) . The second regularity should be the emergence of central counterparty trading.
Indeed, while restricted to dominant players, central counterparty trading has recently gained momentum in the euro area.
16
The comparative statics for feasibility is as suggested by intuition. The lower the default probabilities of lender and borrower, respectively, the more liquid and less risky the collateral, and the less attractive the outside options, the more likely is the market transaction. Vice versa, the worse the rating of lender and borrower, the less liquid and more risky the collateral, and the more acceptable the outside options, the more likely is a break-down of the market relationship.
17
Example 1. As an illustration, assume that both lender and borrower are risk-neutral. Assume also that the liquidation value and the repurchase price of the only available collateral asset is known to be p b and p a with certainty at date 1, respectively, where p a > p b . Consider first the lender. Expected utility at the time of contracting is given by
It is not difficult to see that in any contractible (i.e., efficient) agreement (y, h, r), the lender will not be overprotected, i.e.,
deposits abreast with the development of the market price of the collateral. As our analysis suggests, this is a useful instrument to keep the interests of both parties balanced also in transactions that have a longer maturity. Thus, intuitively, maintenance makes feasibility easier to achieve. 17 Maybe interestingly, the analysis suggests that a borrower may find it easier to transact in the interbank market by offering the lender a collateral whose market value is positively correlated with the lender's survival, such as the lender's own uncovered bonds. This is because overprotection would be without value for the lender, but costly for the borrower. Thus,
Comparing these expressions with the available outside option u L for the lender yields that for a deposit rate r satisfying condition (6) of at least
the lender would be willing to contract against a haircut of h. On the other hand, when (6) is not satisfied, then the lender would be overprotected, and expect at least r D . Thus, in general,
where, as usual, (x) + = x for x > 0 and = 0 otherwise. Using completely analogous arguments, one can see that the borrower would be willing to contract against a haircut of h if and only if the interest rate is at most
where (x) − = x for x < 0 and = 0 otherwise.
Apparently, a repurchase agreement (r, h) is contractible between borrower and lender if and only if ρ
As the expressions (7) and (8) 
are simultaneously satisfied. Rewriting these conditions yields the following intuitive conditions for contractibility
That is, in the case of risk-neutrality and risk-free but illiquid collateral, contracting is impossible if and only if both (9) and (10) are satisfied.
18
Illiquidity of collateral assets might have played a role in the market developments during the second half of the year 2007. On August 9, problems with subprime loans in the US led to a sudden dry-out of the market for asset-backed commercial paper, which has served as a source of funding for so-called structured investment vehicles. Commercial banks with credit commitments vis-à-vis such vehicles had an unexpected increase in liquidity needs. Long-term assets held by the vehicles, such as collateralized debt obligations, could no longer serve as collateral. At the same time, investors that refused to roll over commercial paper have received significant cash transfers to their bank accounts.
18 A closer inspection of Example 1 also shows that with a degenerate price distribution and with risk-neutrality, it can be efficient to protect one party fully against any credit risk. Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) have put forward the argument that commercial banks have the unique ability to pool negatively correlated liquidity risks resulting from loan commitments and deposit contracts. The stylized facts mentioned above might relate our analysis to this pooling argument. Specifically, one could argue that before the turbulences, numerous commercial banks might have decided to specialize and to exploit the syn- 
Welfare implications
In the previous sections, it has been shown that with two-sided credit risk, counterparties seek to use the most liquid and least risky assets as collateral first. A policy issue may arise here when central bank operations have the potential to withhold collateral assets from uses in the interbank market.
To address this issue, a variation of the basic model will be considered in which banks forward collateral also to the central bank. Examined will be the consequences of changing the central bank's collateral policy. Let Assumptions 1 through 6 be satisfied. Assume that (θ 1 (J), θ 2 (J)) is stable.
Then for i = 1, 2, the collateral composition is given by
where j * (i) denotes the largest index such that
Proof. See the Appendix. Proof. See the Appendix. ¤ Theorem 5 contains an unambiguous prediction concerning the welfare im-21 More promising on this front appears the idea to apply different pricing to different collateral, e.g., by using variable-rate tenders for given quantities in each liquidity basket (cf. Federal Reserve System, 2002) . See also Buiter and Sibert (2007) .
plications of an expanded collateral set. If accompanied by an appropriate liquidity policy α 0 , an extension of the set of collateral assets accepted by the central bank will typically increase expected utilities for market participants.
Only when the borrower is close to using the outside option, there may be detrimental effects for the lender.
22
Should now central banks accept illiquid collateral to increase welfare in the banking system, as suggested by Theorem 5? It is be important to note that the predicted change in welfare may be zero. I.e., in view of Theorems 2 and 3, it may well be that the collateral potentially unleashed by an enlargement of the set of eligible collateral will not be used in the market. It could be argued that this is the present situation in the euro area. Then it would not be the case that too much precious collateral is bound in transactions with the central bank. Widening the set of eligible collateral would, therefore, be unlikely to re-establish the proper working of the money market.
23 Indeed, the current problems seem to be linked rather to a general concern about the quality of collateral assets. This concern affects 22 Collateral policy might affect market activity in other ways than suggested by Theorems 3 and 4. Firstly, the usual moral hazard caveat applies. After all, accepting illiquid collateral, especially during times of market stress, works like an insurance of commercial banks against temporary funding problems. Secondly, to the extent that repricing risk of illiquid assets may trigger margin calls, liquidity risks of commercial banks might actually increase. Finally, there may be an impact on relative asset prices.
23 To the extent that the precautionary demand for collateral that can be used with the Eurosystem is high, as suggested by recent media reports (cf. Financial Times, 2008), a relaxation of the criteria for collateral would of course help to improve commerical banks' outside option in case of market breakdown. However, the comparative statics of feasibility (cf. Section 3) suggests that this would make a market breakdown even more likely.
repo trading when default probabilities are perceived to be higher than under normal circumstances. As an alternative policy measure, the analysis hints towards the obvious benefits of central counterparty trading, which could be made accessible for a much wider group of market participants. 
Conclusion
Modern liquidity management increasingly relies on repurchase agreements through which cash is exchanged short-term against collateral assets of longer maturities. Interestingly, almost all such refinancing is based on securities that are very stable in value and actively traded. Market requirements on asset liquidity became even stricter when interbank market conditions tightened, as during the summer 2007 credit crunch. On the other hand, there has been a tendency to deposit more and more illiquid assets for use in the Eurosystem's liquidity-providing operations.
Our analysis has derived a number of theoretical predictions that clarify and explain these and related observations. First, it has been shown that if there is a choice of collateral then the more liquid and less risky asset will allow borrower and lender to achieve a more efficient risk sharing. Moreover, if collateral is illiquid or risky, a market transaction may not come about at all, even when both borrower and lender are risk-neutral. This point has allowed us to apply an important theoretical argument put forward recently 24 The situation may have been different for other major currency areas. Both the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England have taken measures that have the potential of a collateral relief for market participants. Our analysis suggests that these measures might indeed have contributed to the recent easing the pressure on money market rates.
by Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) . Finally, it has been shown that a less restrictive collateral policy by the central bank should typically lead to a welfare improvement for market participants, but also suggests that, essentially unaffected by the haircut, the least liquid and most risky assets will be deposited with the central bank.
For the euro area, the analysis comes to the conclusion that a widening of the set of eligible collateral would not necessarily be supportive for a resolution of the market disruptions. As there is no evidence that too much high quality collateral is bound in central bank operations, the benefit of unleashing collateral of intermediate liquidity into the market might turn out to be very limited. Instead, problems with secured lending seem to be related to a general concern about the quality of collateral assets, which inhibits market performance when there is mutual mistrust between banks. The analysis clearly suggests that money markets would benefit from making central counterparty trading accessible to a wider group of market participants.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. Let e p b = P m j=1 y j e p j b denote the conditional liquidation value of the collateral portfolio net of haircuts, and let F b (.) be the corresponding distribution function. Then, re-writing (1) using integral notation, the lender's expected utility at the time of contracting reads
where p b denotes the realized value of e p b , as in Example 1. The integrand in
otherwise, where p * = ∞ for h = −1. Consequently, (11) can be re-written
Clearly, F b (.) is differentiable. Therefore, using Leibnitz' rule,
where
Therefore, the marginal rate of substitution between haircut and interest rate for the lender is given by
.
A completely analogous derivation for the borrower yields the marginal rate of substitution between haircut and interest rate 
It suffices to show that it is Pareto dominated for lender and borrower to simultaneously use one collateral asset and not fully use up another collateral with a lower index. To provoke a contradiction, assume that
for some k ∈ {0, ..., m − 1}. By Assumption 5, there are constants μ 1 > 0, ..., μ m > 0, and independent random variables e ε 
)
and r 0 = r. Clearly, for δ small enough, the haircut h 0 is well-defined. Moreover, using (13), (15), and 1+h = (1−(μ k+1 −1)δ)(1+h 0 ), it is straightforward to check that for δ small enough, we have 0
A similarly straightforward calculation exploiting (19) through (21) and (14) shows that m X j=1 y 0 j = 1. Hence, for δ small enough, the contract C 0 (δ) is well-defined and valid. It is claimed now that C 0 (δ) achieves a strict Pareto improvement over C. We will show that in fact, the utility level expected at the contracting stage increases strictly both for the lender and the borrower. (19) through (21), one obtains
Using (3), and subsequently (16) 
For j = 0, ..., m, let γ j = (1 + h) P m j=j μ j,j y j , where y 0 = 0, μ j,j = 1, and μ j,j = μ j ·μ j−1 ·...·μ j+1 . Then, a straightforward induction argument involving Assumption 5 shows that
Hence, e v
, where e z is independent from e ε k+1 b
, and , respectively. Then (1) reads
where z and ε k b denote the realizations of the random variables e z and e ε k b . Applying Leibnitz's rule, one obtains Then r L > r 0 > r D . Moreover, for any haircut h ≥ −1, either h < h 0 or
, so there is no interest rate for which the market transaction is individually rational for lender and borrower at the same time. 
Proof. By Lemma A.2, there is a cut-off price p * for collateral 1 such that
Let r D = r 0 − ε and r L = r 0 + ε for ε > 0 small. It will be shown that for ε
where p *
where the integral is either positive or zero. To provoke a contradiction,
and consequently, 
For ε → 0, we would have ρ D (h 0 ) → r 0 , and therefore in the limit
Conditional prices for collateral have densities, so F b (.) and F a (.) are continuous. Hence, for any values
In particular, the integral in (25) is strictly positive. Using Assumption 1, we find a contradiction to the assumption that ρ Let λ be such that
Such a λ exists because of (26). Moreover, λ < P m CB j=1 q 
